We build a model in nominal sets for TST+; typed set theory with typical ambiguity. It is known that this is equivalent to the consistency of Quine's New Foundations.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following false reasoning: define x = {a | a ∈ a}. It is easy to check that x ∈ x if and only if x ∈ x. This is Russell's paradox and is one of the central paradoxes of (naive) set theory.
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) avoids paradox by insisting instead that a be guarded; we can only form {a∈y | a ∈ a} where y is already known to be a set. The price we pay for this is that we cannot form 'reasonable' sets such as the universal set {a | ⊤} (the set of all sets) or the set of 'all sets with 2 elements', and so on. In ZF, these are proper classes.
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New Foundations (NF) avoids paradox by insisting on a stratifiable language [Quine 1937] . Every variable and term can be assigned a level, such that we only form s∈ ∈ ∈t provided that level (s) = level (t)-1. So a ∈ a and a ∈ a are outlawed because no matter what level i we assign to a, we cannot make i be equal to i-1. We can stratify ⊤ so we can still form the universal set in NF (and 'has 2 elements' is also stratifiable). Excellent discussions are in [Forster 1995] and [Holmes 1998 ], and a clear summary with a brief but well-chosen bibliography is in [Forster 1997] .
However, at the time of writing we know of no published proof of consistency for NF (relative e.g. to ZF). This has been the situation since NF was introduced in 1937 in [Quine 1937] .
This paper presents what the author believes to be a full proof of the consistency of NF.
This paper uses nominal techniques, which are based on Fraenkel-Mostowski set theory (FM), itself based on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with atoms (ZFA).
2
More discussion is in the body of the paper, and in the Conclusions.
Map of the paper
This paper proves consistency of TST+ (typed set theory with typical ambiguity) relative to FM sets (Fraenkel-Mostowski set theory); consistency of NF follows since NF is known to be consistent relative to TST+ [Specker 1962 ].
More specifically we use nominal techniques in FM sets, and more specifically still this paper builds on nominal theories of posets and representations of first-order logic, most notably from [Dowek and Gabbay 2012; Gabbay 2012] . Whereas those papers were broadly concerned with the theory of all models, this paper is concerned with one specific concrete model since the existence of one model is all we need for consistency.
A predicate is interpreted as a set of points, where a point can be viewed (if we squint) as filters of predicates. The overall design therefore resembles a representation theorem, like the Stone representation for Boolean Algebra (a clear presentation is in [Halmos and Givant 1998, §34] ), though this paper differs from a Stone representation in some significant details, most notably in that it represents TST+ instead of Boolean Algebra.
Readers coming to this paper from a theoretical computer science background-many of those most familiar with nominal techniques will fit this description-can think of the paper as follows: TST+ is a simply-typed λ-calculus enriched with one axiom(-scheme); see Definitions 9.4 and 10.10. It is an extremely simple system to specify, if a difficult one to prove consistent. We prove consistency by a series of nominal inductive proofs, with a bit of semantic argument (with a coinductive flavour) entering later on, when we proof properties of points and sets of points. To a first useful approximation, if in this paper the reader sees the word predicate, they can substitute element of ground type; wherever they see the word set, they can substitute lambda-term; and no harm should come of it.
1 A nice historical account of Russell's paradox is in [Griffin 2004] . For ZF set theory, see e.g. [Jech 2006] . 2 Familiarity with all these different set theories is not necessary to understand the body of the paper. Accounts of them tailored specifically to nominal techniques and mostly compatible with the notations and conventions of this paper, appear in [Gabbay 2001; Gabbay 2011] . A linkage of some 'nominal' ideas to some corresponding 'Fraenkel-Mostowski sets' ideas is given in [Gabbay 2011, Remark 2.22] .
To the reader familiar with the sets literature, a warning: a related theory NFU (NF with urelemente) is known to be consistent and is discussed in detail in [Holmes 1998 ]. The atoms in ZFA/FM are also sometimes called urelemente. These are different: the atoms of this paper are not like the urelemente of NFU. If the reader sees the word 'atom' here, they should think of ZFA/FM atoms and not NFU urelemente.
It may also be worth stating explicitly that this is a paper about NF, but it is not a paper in NF. Familiarity with NF (or TST+) as reasoning systems and foundations of mathematics, with all their unique and special features, is not assumed, nor necessary to understand this paper. This paper has overlapping design criteria which had to be made to fit together in just the right way. We can draw out the main threads:
-We start with a nominal abstract datatype of internal predicates (Definition 3.1).
-We give internal predicates X a σ-action (a substitution action) satisfying good properties, the more important of which are listed as nominal algebra equalities (Figures 1 and 2 ). -Internal predicates get a denotation as sets of points where points are sets of pairs of the form a•x whose intuition is 'x is an element of a' (Figure 3) . Here x = [a]X is a nominal atoms-abstraction of an internal predicate (see below) and a is an FM set atom or urelement-the handling of these atoms is off-the-shelf using nominal techniques. These conditions are chosen carefully ( Figure 5 ). -Points are subject to consistency conditions which we can think of as filters.
-If we write [ [-] ] for 'the denotation of' then [ [{a | φ}] ] is interpreted as [a] [ [φ] ]. Here [a]-is nominal atoms-abstraction, a generalisation of α-abstraction from syntax. If X is an internal predicate we call [a]X an internal set. -So: the denotation of a sets comprehension is just the atoms-abstraction of the denotation of the relevant predicate. In fact, the denotation of a set nearly is the denotation of a predicate, up to choosing a fresh name for the abstracted/bound atom. -Atoms-abstraction benefit from powerful and convenient nominal reasoning principles, and sets of atoms-abstractions tend to remain relatively small, unlike sets of functions which tend (by famous diagonalisation arguments) to grow relatively large. -Because internal predicates have denotations as sets of points, and points contain internal predicates, the denotation has a coinductive structure, which is just a fancy way of saying that they can be organised into a graph which may contain loops. The denotation of the universal set is a graph containing a loop to itself. -A key technical device is the use of an σ-action (amgis-action), which is a dual to the σ-action (Figure 4 ). It helps us to prove extensionality results; for a discussion see Remark 5.24. -We model quantification as a conjunction of instances to values (see Figure 3 rule (modall)) and equality as an extensional equality using quantification (Section 8) . This all depends on the careful design of values (Definition 5.1), and its interaction with filter conditions from Figure 5 . -Finally, we interpret the languages of TST and TST+ in the denotation and note that the interpretation is sound, and the denotation is non-trivial. Consistency follows (Corollaries 9.19 and 10.16).
BACKGROUND ON NOMINAL TECHNIQUES
Intuitively, a nominal set is "a set X whose elements x ∈ X may 'contain' finitely many names a, b, c ∈ A". We may call names atoms. The notion of 'contain' used here is not the obvious notion of 'is a set element of': formally, we say that x has finite support (Definition 2.9). For instance, here are some nominal sets:
-The set of atoms:
a, b, c, . . . .
-The set of finite sets of atoms:
∅, {a}, {b}, {c}, . . . , {a, b}, {a, c}, . . . .
-The set of complements of finite sets of atoms:
A, A\{a}, A\{b}, A\{c}, . . . , A\{a, b}, A\{a, c}, . . . .
Nominal sets are formally defined in Subsection 2.1, and examples are in Subsections 2.2 and 2.4.
The reader might prefer to read this section only briefly at first, and then use it as a reference for the later sections where these underlying ideas get applied. More detailed expositions are also in [Gabbay and Pitts 2001; Gabbay 2011; Pitts 2013] .
In the context of the broader literature, the message of this section is as follows:
-The reader with a category-theory background can read this section as exploring the category of nominal sets, or equivalently the Schanuel topos (more on this in [Mac Lane and Moerdijk 1992, Section III.9] , [Johnstone 2003, A.21, page 79] , or [Gabbay 2011, Theorem 9 .14]). -The reader with a sets background can read this section as stating that we use Fraenkel-Mostowski set theory (FM sets).
A discussion of this sets foundation, tailored to nominal techniques, can be found in [Gabbay 2011, Section 10] ). FM sets add urelemente or atoms to the sets universe. -The reader uninterested in foundations can note that previous work [Gabbay and Pitts 2001;  Gabbay 2011] has shown that the apparently inconsequential first step of assuming names as primitive entities in Definition 2.1 we obtain a remarkable clutch of definitions and results, notably Theorem 2.11 and Corollary 2.12, and Theorems 2.15 and 2.21.
Further discussion is in the body of the paper and in the Conclusions; see in particular Subsections 11.3 and 11.4.
Basic definitions
We will need an infinite hierarchy of atoms to reflect the infinite hierarchy of levels implied by stratification. This is no problem: D 2.1. -For each number i∈Z fix a disjoint countably infinite set of atoms A i . -Write A = i∈Z A i .
-If a∈A (so a is an atom) write level (a) for the unique number such that a∈A level(a) .
-We use a permutative convention that a, b, c, . . . range over distinct atoms.
If we do not wish to use the permutative convention then we will refer to the atom using n (see for instance (σeltatm) of Figure 1 ). D 2.2. A (finite) permutation π is a bijection on atoms such that -nontriv (π) = {a | π(a) = a} is finite.
-If π(a) = a then there exists some i∈Z such that π(a), a ∈ A i . In words: π respects the level of atoms. N 2.3. Write id for the identity permutation such that id(a) = a for all a. Write
. If i∈Z and a, b∈A i then write (a b) for the swapping (terminology from [Gabbay and Pitts 2001] ) mapping a to b, b to a, and all other c to themselves, and take (a a) = id.
A set with a permutation action X is a pair (|X|, ·) of an underlying set |X| and a permutation action written π·x which is a group action on |X|, so that id·x = x and π·(π ′ ·x) = (π • π ′ )·x for all x ∈ X and permutations π and π ′ . Say that A ⊆ A supports x ∈ X when ∀π.π ∈ fix (A) ⇒ π·x = x. If a finite A supporting x exists, call x finitely supported. N 2.6. If X is a set with a permutation action then we may write x ∈ X as shorthand for x ∈ |X|, and X ⊆ X as shorthand for X ⊆ |X|. D 2.7. Call a set with a permutation action X a nominal set when every x ∈ X has finite support. X, Y, Z will range over nominal sets. D 2.8. Call a function f ∈ X⇒Y equivariant when π·(f (x)) = f (π·x) for all permutations π and x ∈ X. In this case write f : X⇒Y.
The category of nominal sets and equivariant functions between them is usually called the category of nominal sets. D 2.9. Suppose X is a nominal set and x ∈ X. Define the support of x by supp(x) = {A | A finite and supports x}. N 2.10. -Write a#x as shorthand for a ∈ supp(x) and read this as a is fresh for x. -If T ⊆A write T #x as shorthand for ∀a∈T.a#x.
-Given atoms a 1 , . . . , a n and elements x 1 , . . . , x m write a 1 , . . . , a n #x 1 , . . . , x m as shorthand for ∀1≤j≤m.{a 1 , . . . , a n }#x j . That is: a i #x j for every i and j.
T 2.11. Suppose X is a nominal set and x ∈ X. Then supp(x) is the unique least finite set of atoms that supports x.
Proof. See part 1 of Theorem 2.21 of [Gabbay 2011]. 
Examples
Suppose X and Y are nominal sets. We consider some examples, some of which will be useful later.
Atoms.
A is a nominal set with the natural permutation action π·a = π(a).
Cartesian product.
X × Y is a nominal set with underlying set {(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y} and the pointwise action π·(x, y) = (π·x, π·y).
Full function space.
X→Y is a set with a permutation action with underlying set all functions from |X| to |Y|, and the conjugation permutation action
Finitely supported function space.
X⇒Y is a nominal set with underlying set the functions from |X| to |Y| with finite support under the conjugation action, and the conjugation permutation action.
Full powerset D
2.13. Suppose Z is a set with a permutation action. Give subsets Z ⊆ Z the pointwise permutation action
Then powerset (Z) (the full powerset of Z) is a set with a permutation action with -underlying set {Z | Z ⊆ Z} (the set of all subsets of |Z|), and -the pointwise action π·Z = {π·z | z ∈ Z}.
A particularly useful instance of the pointwise action is for sets of atoms. As discussed in Subsection 2.2.1 above, if a ∈ A then π·a = π(a). Thus if A ⊆ A then π·A means {π(a) | a ∈ A}. We consider further examples in Subsection 2.4.
The principle of equivariance and the NEW quantifier
We come to Theorem 2.15, which is central to the 'look and feel' of nominal techniques. It enables a particularly efficient management of renaming and α-conversion in syntax and semantics and captures why it is so useful to use names in the foundations of our semantics and not, for instance, numbers. Names are by definition symmetric (i.e. can be permuted). Taking names and permutations as primitive implies that permutations propagate to the things we build using them. This is the principle of equivariance (Theorem 2.15 below; see also [Gabbay 2011, Subsection 4.2] and [Gabbay and Pitts 2001, Lemma 4.7] ).
The principle of equivariance implies that, provided we permute names uniformly in all the parameters of our definitions and theorems, we then get another valid set of definitions and theorems. This is not true of e.g. numbers, because numbers are equipped by construction with canonical properties such as less than or equal to ≤, which put them in order. By design, atoms do not have that.
T 2.15. If x is a list x 1 , . . . , x n , write π·x for π·x 1 , . . . , π·x n . Suppose Φ(x) is a first-order logic predicate with free variables x. Suppose Υ(x) is a function specified using a first-order predicate with free variables x. Then we have the following principles:
(1) Equivariance of predicates. Φ(x) ⇔ Φ(π·x). R 2.16. Theorem 2.15 is three fancy ways of observing that if a specification is symmetric in atoms, then the the result must be at least as symmetric as the inputs. We will use Theorem 2.15 frequently in this paper, either to move permutations around (parts 1 and 2) or to get 'free' bounds on the support of elements (part 3).
'Free' here means 'we know it from the form of the definition, without having to verify it by concrete calculations'. Theorem 2.15, and also R 2.19. We can read N as 'for all but finitely many a', 'for cofinitely many a', 'for fresh a', or 'for new a'. It captures a generative aspect of names, that for any x we can find plenty of atoms a such that a ∈ supp(x). N was designed in [Gabbay and Pitts 2001] to model the quantifier being used when we informally write "rename x in λx.t to be fresh", or "emit a fresh channel name" or "generate a fresh memory cell". R 2.20. It is impossible to overstate the importance and convenience of the N-quantifier and Theorem 2.21, which we prove next. N is a 'for most' quantifier [Westerståhl 1989] , and is a generalised quantifier [Keenan and Westerståhl 1996, Section 1.2.1]. It means 'for all but finitely many atoms'.
N over nominal sets satisfies the some/any property that -to prove a N-quantified property we test it for one fresh atom; but -we may use a N-quantified property for any fresh atom. This is Theorem 2.21, which we use repeatedly in this paper every time we write 'Choose fresh a', without proving that it does not matter which fresh atom a we choose. What makes N special is not its definition as 'for all but finitely many atoms', but the ∀/∃ symmetry property which arises specifically when N is applied in a nominal context to symmetric atoms with an assumption of finite (or more generally 'small') support. 
Proof. See Theorem 6.5 from [Gabbay 2011] or Proposition 4.10 from [Gabbay and Pitts 2001] .
Further examples
We now consider the finitely supported powerset and the strictly finitely supported powerset. These examples are more technically challenging and will be key to the later constructions.
Finitely supported powerset
D 2.22. Suppose X is a nominal set. Then let NomPset (X) (the nominal powerset) be the nominal set with -underlying set those X ⊆ X that are finitely supported, and -the pointwise action π·X = {π·x | x ∈ X} inherited from Definition 2.13.
As the name suggests, the nominal powerset is the powerset object in the category of nominal sets [Gabbay 2011, Lemma 9.10] . N 2.23. If X is a nominal set then write X ⊆ nom |X| when X ∈ |NomPset (X)| (that is, when X is a finitely supported subset of |X|. D 2.24. Suppose X is a nominal set and X∈NomPset (X). Call X equivariant when supp(X) = ∅; using Notation 2.10 we write a#X for every a. Proof. It suffices to provide a counterexample. Take X = X = A. It is a fact that supp(X) = ∅ and for any a ∈ X we have supp(a) = {a} ⊆ ∅.
Finite powerset
D 2.27. Suppose X is a nominal set. Write FinPow (X) for the nominal set with -underlying set the set of all finite subsets of X, -with the pointwise action from Definitions 2.13 and 2.22. 
, so we are done.
INTERNAL PREDICATES
3.1. Basic definition D 3.1. Define nominal abstract syntax datatypes Pred of internal predicates and Set i for i∈Z of internal (level i) sets inductively as follows, where κ ranges over ordinals: 
Define:
Write age(X) for the least κ such that X∈Pred κ and age(x) for the least κ such that x∈Set We still use a nominal atoms-abstraction, which builds in α-equivalence properties in the standard way for nominal abstract syntax.
9 Lemma 3.5 makes this formal: L 3.5. Suppose X∈Pred and i∈Z and a, a ′ ∈A i and a ′ #X. Then:
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 2.32, and Lemma 2.31 with Theorem 2.15.
Some useful notation
This subsection is organised as follows:
-Notation 3.6 aids readability. -In Definition 3.9 we consider a simple example of an internal set. -Notation 3.11 gives some natural ways to build new internal sets out of old ones. Notation 3.6 will be useful later, but we mention it now as an example; the intended meaning of the notation should be clear:
E 3.7. Define false ∈ Pred and true ∈ Pred by false = or(∅) and true = and(∅). Intuitively, false represents the empty disjunction, which is 'internal false', and true represents the empty conjunction, with is 'internal truth'. We make this formal later, in Corollary 5.23. -Suppose z∈Set i and a∈A i-1 and a#z. Then we write cmp(z) = [a]neg(z@a). It follows from Lemma 2.35 that Notation 3.11 is well-defined. Clearly, int, uni, and cmp are intended to represent sets intersection, union, and complement; we make this formal in Lemma 8.7. More on this also in Appendix A.
The minimum level
Levels are in Z and are totally ordered by ≤ but not well-founded (since integers can 'go downwards forever').
However, it is not hard to note that any (finite) internal predicate or internal set can mention only finitely many levels, so we can calculate the minimum level of a predicate or set, which is lower bound on the levels of atoms appearing in that predicate or set. We will use this lower bound to reason inductively on levels in Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.9. D 3.12. Define minlevel (Z) and minlevel (z) the minimum level of Z or z, inductively on Z∈Pred and z∈Set i for i∈Z as follows:
Above, min(I) is the least element of I ⊆ fin Z.
10
It will be convenient to apply minlevel to a mixed list of internal predicates, atoms, and internal sets:
for the least element of {minlevel (l 1 ), . . . , minlevel (l n )}.
THE SIGMA-ACTION
4.1. Basic definitions and lemmas D 4.1. Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i . Then define a σ-action (sigma-action) inductively by the rules in Figure 1 . In that figure: -In rule (σand), X ⊆ fin Pred.
-In rule (σneg), X∈Pred.
-In rule (σall), X∈Pred and b∈A j for some j∈Z.
-In rule (σelta), a ′ ∈A i-1 . -In rule (σeltatm), n ranges over all atoms in A i (not just those distinct from a).
(σand)
and ( (1) We do not know that X ∈ Pred implies X[a →x] ∈ Pred, so we should not write and({X[a →x] | . . . }) on the right-hand side of (σand), or indeed X[a →x] on the right-hand side of (σneg), and so on. In fact, all right-hand sides of Figure 1 are suspect except those of (σa) and (σb). (2) We do not know whether the choice of fresh a ′ ∈A i-1 in (σelta) matters, so we do not know that (σelta) is well-defined. (3) The definition looks inductive at first glance, however in the case of (σelta) there is no guarantee that X (on the right-hand side) is smaller than elt(y, a) (on the left-hand side). The level of a ′ is strictly lower than the level of a, however levels are taken from Z which is totally ordered but not well-ordered by ≤.
In fact:
-X ∈ Pred does indeed imply X[a →x] ∈ Pred.
-The choice of fresh a ′ in (σelta) is immaterial. -The levels of atoms involved are bounded below by the minimal levels of the inputs to the inductive clause, so we are only ever working on a well-founded fragment of Z.
We prove all this in Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.4. Would it be more rigorous to interleave the proofs of these lemmas with the definition, so that at each stage we are confident that what we are writing actually makes sense? Certainly we could; the reader inclined to worry about this need only read Definition 4.1 alongside Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 as a simultaneous inductive argument on (level (a), age(X)) lexicographically ordered.
Recall minlevel from Definition 3.12: P 4.3. Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i .
Proof. Fix some k∈Z. We prove the Proposition for all Z, a, x and z, a, x such that minlevel (Z, a, x)≥k and minlevel (z, a, x)≥k, by induction on (level (a), age(Z)) and (level (a), age(z)) lexicographically ordered. Since k was arbitrary, this suffices to prove it for all Z, a, x and z, a, x. We consider the possibilities for Z∈Pred:
-The case of and(X ) for X ⊆ fin Pred.
We use the inductive hypothesis on each X ′ [a →x] and some easy arithmetic calculations.
′ for X ′ ∈Pred and b∈A j for some j∈Z. Using Lemma 3.5(1) we may assume without loss of generality that b#x. By Figure 1 
We use the inductive hypothesis on X ′ [a →x]. -The case of elt(z, a) for z∈Set i-1 . There are two sub-cases:
-Suppose x=atm(n) for some n∈A i . By Figure 1 
We have the inductive hypothesis on z[a →x]. We chose a ′ #x so by Lemma 3.8 x@a ′ ∈ Pred. We also have the inductive hypothesis (since
, and this suffices. -The case of elt(z, c) where c∈A k and z∈Set k-1 and k∈Z.
By Figure 1 (σeltb) and the inductive hypothesis.
We consider the possibilities for z∈Set k :
-The case that z is an internal atom. We use (σa) or ( 
((σα))
. Suppose i∈Z and a, a ′ ∈A i and x∈Set i . Suppose Z∈Pred and a ′ #Z and k∈Z and z∈Set k and a ′ #z. Then:
Proof. By induction on Z and z. We consider the possibilities for Z∈Pred:
-The case of and(X ) for X ⊆ fin Pred. By Lemma 2.29 a#X ′ for every X ′ ∈X , so by the inductive hypothesis -Suppose x=atm(n) for some n∈A i . We reason as follows:
. We reason as follows: -The case elt(y, b) for j∈Z and b∈A j and y∈Set j-1 . We reason as follows:
-The case that z is an internal atom. We use (σa) or (σb) of Figure 1 .
-The case that z is a comprehension. We use Lemma 2.34(2) for a fresh
, and the inductive hypothesis on z@c.
For part 2, we note that by Theorem 2.15 and Proposition 2.17
We take a sets intersection. The case of z is similar. Part 3 follows, recalling from Notation 2.10 that a#x means a ∈supp(x). Many of these properties are familiar from syntax: for instance (σα) looks like an α-equivalence property-and indeed that is exactly what it is-and (σ#) (Lemma 4.6) is sometimes called garbage collection and corresponds to the property "if a is not free in t then t[a →s] = t". This is expected: a feature of nominal techniques is that properties familiar from syntax reappear in some semantic form (e.g. 'fresh for' reflects 'not free in', or (σ#) reflects a familiar garbagecollection property).
But, the proofs of these properties are not replays of the familiar syntactic properties. Partly this because the proofs use (unfamiliar?) nominal reasoning, but also it is because the σ-action on Pred is not a simple 'tree-grafting'-not even a capture-avoiding one-because of (σelta) in Figure 1 . The proofs work, but we cannot take that for granted and they require checking.
Property (σ#) (garbage collection)
L 4.6 ((σ#)). Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i and Z∈Pred and z∈Set k for k∈Z. Then
Proof. By induction on Z and z. We consider the possibilities for Z∈Pred: Using Lemma 3.5(1) we may assume without loss of generality that b#x.
We use the inductive hypothesis on X. -The case of elt(y, a) for i∈Z and y∈Set i-1 . This is impossible because we assumed a#Z. -The case of elt(y, b) for j∈Z and b∈A j and y∈Set j-1 .
By Figure 1 
We use the inductive hypothesis on y.
-If z is an internal atom then we reason using (σa) or (σb) of Figure 1 .
-If z is a comprehension then we use Lemma 2.34(2) for a fresh
Recall false=or(∅) from Example 3.7. Corollary 4.7 is an easy consequence of Lemma 4.6 and will be useful later: C 4.7. Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i . Then
Proof. By Theorem 2.15 supp(false)=∅ so that a#x. We use Lemma 4.6.
4.3.2.
σ commutes with atoms-concretion. Lemma 4.8 will be useful later, starting with Lemma 4.9: L 4.8 ((σ@)). Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i . Suppose k∈Z and z ∈ Set k and c∈A k-1 and c#z, x. Then
Proof. Note that by Lemma 2.33 (since c#z) z@c exists. We reason as follows:
Lemma 2.34(2), c#z
σ commutes with itself: the 'substitution lemma'.
The inductive quantity we use in Lemma 4.9 will be (level (a), age(Z)), lexicographically ordered. It will become clear in the proof how this works: L 4.9. Suppose Z∈Pred and k∈Z and z∈Set k . Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i and suppose j∈Z and b∈A j and y∈Set j and a#y. Then
Proof. For brevity we may write
. Fix some k∈Z. We prove the Lemma for all Z, a, x, b, y and z, a, x, b, y such that minlevel (Z, a, x, b, y)≥k and minlevel (z, a, x, b, y)≥k (Definition 3.12), reasoning by induction on (level (a), age(Z)) and (level (a), age(z)) lexicographically ordered. Since k was arbitrary, this suffices to prove it for all Z, a, x, b, y and z, a, x, b, y.
We consider the possibilities for Z∈Pred:
-The case of and(X ) for X ⊆ fin Pred. We use rule (σand) of Figure 1 and the inductive hypothesis.
-The case of neg(X) for X∈Pred. We use (σneg) of Figure 1 and the inductive hypothesis.
-The case of all[a ′ ]X for X∈Pred and a ′ ∈A i ′ for some i ′ ∈Z. We use Lemma 3.5(1) to assume without loss of generality that a ′ #x, y, and then we use (σall) of Figure 1 and the inductive hypothesis.
-The case of elt(z, b) for z∈Set j-1 where j∈Z. There are two sub-cases:
-Suppose y=atm(n) for some n∈A i . We reason as follows: 
Figure 1(σelta)
-The case of elt(z, a) for z∈Set i-1 where i∈Z. There are two sub-cases: -Suppose x=atm(n) for some n∈A i . We reason as follows:
. We reason as follows:
-The case of elt(z, c) for k∈Z and c∈A k and z∈Set k-1 . We reason as follows:
-If z is an internal atom then we reason using (σa) and (σb) of Figure 1. -If z is a comprehension then we use Lemma 2.34(2) for a fresh c∈A k-1 (so c#z), (σ[]), and the inductive hypothesis on z@c. R 4.10. Were Lemma 4.9 about the syntax of first-order logic or the λ-calculus, then it would probably be called the substitution lemma, and the proof would be a routine induction on syntax.
In fact, even in the case of first-order logic or the λ-calculus, the proof is not routine. Issues with binders ( Figure 1 has two: one implicit in (σelta), and one explicit in (σ[])) were the original motivation for the author's thesis [Gabbay 2001 ] and for nominal techniques in general. Our use of nominal techniques in this paper is more extensive and more interested in semantics; so nominal abstract syntax is present but more as a background technology than a stand-out feature.
For a standard non-rigorous non-nominal proof of the substitution lemma see [Barendregt 1984] ; for a detailed discussion of the lemma in the context of Nominal Isabelle, see [Barendregt's Substitution Lemma 2014] which includes many further references.
But the proof of Lemma 4.9 is not just a replay of the proofs; neither in the 'classic' sense of [Barendregt 1984] nor in the 'nominal' sense of [Gabbay 2001; Barendregt's Substitution Lemma 2014] . This is because of the interaction of elt with the σ-action, mostly because of (σelta) (to a lesser extent also because of the nominal binder (σ[])).
(σid): substitution for atoms.
We called atm(a) in Definition 3.1 an internal atom. Atoms in nominal techniques interpet variables, so if we call atm(a) an internal atom this should suggest that atm(a) should behave like a variable (or a variable symbol). Rules (σa) and (σb) from Figure 1 are consistent with that, and Lemma 4.11 makes formal more of this intuition: L 4.11 ((σid)). Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i . Then:
Proof. We reason by induction on age(Z) and age(z). We consider the possibilities for Z∈Pred:
for Z ′ ∈Pred then we use rules (σand) and (σneg) of Figure 1 and the inductive hypothesis. Figure 1 and the inductive hypothesis.
-If Z = elt(z, b) for j∈Z and b∈A j and z∈Set j-1 then we use rule (σeltb) of Figure 1 and the inductive hypothesis. -If Z = elt(z, a) for z∈Set i-1 then we use (σeltatm) of Figure 1 and the inductive hypothesis for z.
-If z is an atom then we reason using (σa) or (σb) of Figure 1 .
-If z is a comprehension then we use Lemma 2.34(2) for a fresh c∈A k-1 (so c#z), (σ[]), and the inductive hypothesis on z@c.
THE DENOTATION OF AN INTERNAL PREDICATE
In this Section we study prepoints (Definition 5.15). In the notation of Definition 5.15, the intuition of p = {a•x | a•x ∈ p} ∈ PrPt is a conjunction of assertions of the form 'x is an element of a' or 'elt(x, a)'. This is the basic building block of predicates (see Definition 3.1) so it makes sense to build (pre)points out of them.
The main results of this Section are Proposition 5.29 and Theorem 5.31. Prepoints are only preliminary; what we really need are points, which are prepoints subject to filter-like consistency conditions. We build points next in Section 6.
Values
We will need Definition 5.1, starting with (modall) in Figure 5 . Recall int, uni, and cmp from Notation 3.11:
Define internal values Val i -we will usually just call them values-where i∈Z inductively by:
The most interesting part of Definition 5.1 is condition 1:
-It gives us Lemma 5.4, which we use in Lemma 5.30 which is needed for Theorem 6.11. -In our main extensionality result Theorem 8.10, it gives us a#v (actually written c#v, in that proof).
The overall structure of values is also convenient for induction, and we will exploit this. The most important of these inductions is (again) Theorem 8.10. Lemma 5.3 is easy to check, and will be useful. Recall
Proof. By a routine induction on Definition 5.1 using condition 1.
5. An example-arguably the canonical example-of an internal set that is not a value is [b]elt(atm(b), a) for i∈Z and a∈A i and b∈A i-1 . R 5.6. Intuitively, we can think of an internal value u as being a sets comprehension of the form {a | i j (u ij ∈a ⇒ polarity ij )} where i and j range over finite indexing sets, the u ij are themselves values, and for each i and j, polarity ij ∈ {⊤, ⊥}.
In fact, an internal value is just a piece of nominal abstract syntax. It has a denotatation which we will develop later, which will make this intuition formal: we give internal sets (not just values) denotations as atoms-abstractions of sets of points in Figure 3 .
It may be worth emphasising that even though values are closed (in the sense of Lemma 5.4), the mathematical framework with which we define, manipulate, and prove things about them, is decidedly open. This is where nominal techniques help.
An obvious generalisation of values is to allow i and j to range over infinite indexing sets-we would have to generalise the syntax of internal predicates accordingly, so that X in and(X ) can be infinite. We would still require finite support (so that we can define nominal atoms-abstraction), and an upper bound on quantifier depth (Definition 5.11; so we can inductively define Figure 5 ). This should not be a problem, but for a consistency proof what have we will suffice.
We need Notation 5.7 to develop Definition 5.8, which by Lemma 5.10 gives an example of an infinite collection of values: N 5.7. Suppose i∈Z and x∈Set i-2 . Choose fresh c∈A i-1 (so c#x). Define contains(x)∈Set i by
5.8. Suppose i∈Z and recall emp i from Definition 3.9. Extend this definition to num(n) i for all n≥0 as follows:
R 5.9. Intuitively, 0 corresponds to ∅ and n+1 corresponds to {a | n∈a}.
L 5.10. If i∈Z and n≥0 then:
Proof. By a routine induction on n. The base case of n=0 is Lemma 5.3.
More on num(n) i in Proposition 8.16.
Quantifier depth
We need the notion of quantifier depth for Definition 5.16 in the next Subsection:
If X∈Pred write qd (X) for the quantifier depth of X-the maximum number of nested all appearing in the syntax of X:
Above, max (I) is the greatest element of I ⊆ fin N; by convention we take max (∅)=0. P 5.12.
(1) Suppose i∈Z and X∈Pred and u∈Val i . Then qd (X[a →u]) ≤ qd (X). (2) Suppose i∈Z and u∈Val i and a∈A i-1 and a#u (so that by Lemma 2.34(2) u = [a](u@a)) and
Proof. By induction on (level (a), age(X)) and (level (a), age(u)). For part 1 we reason as follows; we consider only the interesting cases:
-The case that X=elt(y, b) for j∈Z and y∈Set j-1 and b∈A j . We reason as follows:
IH age(y)<age(elt(y, b)).
-The case that X=elt(x, a) for x∈Set i-1 . We reason as follows, where a ′ ∈A i-1 is fresh (so a ′ #u, x):
IH age(x)<age(elt(x, a)).
For part 2 we reason as follows: -The case that u=[a]elt(v, a) for v∈Val i-1 and x=atm(n) for n∈A i-1 (where n is not necessarily distinct from a). We reason as follows:
Fact of Definition 5.11
We reason as follows:
Prepoints and the denotation
Recall Set i (internal sets) from Definition 3.1 and NomPset (the nominal powerset) from Definition 2.22. N 5.13. Define Base (as in base predicates) by
We let α range over elements of Base and we may write α as a•x where i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i-1 . R 5.14. The intuition of α=a•x is that it has the meaning of 'elt(x, a)', or in more standard notation 'x ∈ a'.
Since these internal predicates are in a sense the base case in Definition 3.1, we call the set of all α Base. Another name for these might be Atomic, for 'atomic predicates', but that might cause confusion with atoms. So a prepoint p is a finitely supported subset of i∈Z A i × Set i-1 . D 5.16. Given equivariant P ⊆ PrPt define mappings taking -an internal predicate X∈Pred to a set of prepoints X P ⊆P, and -an internal set x∈Set i where i∈Z to an atoms-abstraction
by the rules in Figure 3 . Note that in (modand) we take ∅ = PrPt thus and(∅) P = PrPt. R 5.17. We discuss the rules in Figure 3: -(modand) translates conjunction to sets intersection, and (modneg) translates negation to sets complement. No surprises here. -(modall) translates quantification to an intersection of value instances.
-(modelt) translates the assertion 'x is an element of a' to the set of points that contain a•x.
Note that this is an intensional definition: if x P = y P it does not follow that elt(x, a) P = elt(y, a)
P . This intensionality is useful because it avoids circularity in the definition of -P . Extensionality will hold . . . for certain P. However, finding such a value and proving it well-behaved requires effort: the culminating proofs are in Subsection 8.2. See also Remark 8.9. -Rule (modatm) identifies atm(a) with [b] elt(atm(b), a) , or in more traditional notation with {b | b∈a}, thus identifying atm(a) with its extension. We intend our semantics to be extensional (proofs in Subsection 8.2), so in fact this is the only possible option for (modatm).
If we look back to rules ( σa) and ( σatm) of Figure 4 and rules (σelta) and (σeltatm) of Figure 1 , we can verify that ( σatm) can be viewed as a special case of (σelta), and (σeltatm) can be viewed as a special case of (σelta) under this interpretation. This duplication affects the proofs: for instance the cases for y=atm(n) and x=atm(n) in the proof of Lemma 4.9 are 'morally' duplicates of the case
However, this price is worth paying: we do not take atm(a) to be sugar for [b]elt(atm(b), a), because this mentions atm(b), which has a lower level. Since levels are in Z this would lead to an infinite regression in some proofs. More technically, we need atm(a) to be primitive in the syntax so that we can define minlevel in Definition 3.12 and so argue inductively in Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.9. -Rule (modset) translates sets comprehension to a nominal atoms-abstraction. Though a simple enough equality to write out, it is highly significant: partly because it formally asserts Equation 1 of Subsection 11.3, and partly because while we can emulate nominal atoms-abstraction in syntax (on the left) in ZF sets, it would be far harder to do this in the semantics (on the right). 
Proof. From Notation 3.6 by sets calculations with (modand) and (modneg) from Figure 3 . R 5.20. X P can be viewed as a kind of graph as follows:
-Nodes have the form p∈P or X P for X∈Pred. -There is an edge from X P to p∈P when p ∈ X P . -There is an edge labelled a from p to [c]
Thus the denotation of Figure 3 can be thought of as a coinductive structure. It is not quite a graph, because p transitions not to a node but to an atoms-abstraction of a node-in fact such transition systems are a natural nominal model for systems that can create new/local names, and were considered by the author for the π-calculus in [Gabbay 2003 ], but developing these is out of scope for this paper. It is still reasonable to say that the denotation of an internal predicate is a graph.
We do not make these intuitions formal in this paper; we do not develop a theory of graphs-withname-generation and a general class of the models to which the concrete model of this paper belongs. Such an analysis would be very interesting, but it belongs to future work.
This coinductive structure, even though we leave it slightly implicit, exerts a concrete technical influence on the mathematics in this paper, most notably in Subsections 5.5 and 5.6 when we introduce the σ-action which is dual to the σ-action, and which is vital amongst other things for the extensionality results in Theorem 7.1 and Lemma 7.3.
5.4. Changing the parameter P P 5.21. Suppose P, P ′ ⊆ PrPt are equivariant and P ⊆ P ′ . Suppose X∈Pred. Then -∀p∈P.p∈ X P ′ ⇔ p∈ X P and as a corollary -X
Proof. Consider p∈P. We work by induction on (qd (X), age(X)), lexicographically ordered (qd is from Definition 5.11):
p ∈ and(X )
-The case of all[a]X for X∈Pred and a∈A i for some i∈Z. Note by Proposition 5.12 that
. Suppose P⊆PrPt is equivariant and X∈Pred and p∈PrPt. Then
Proof. From Proposition 5.21 by easy sets calculations.
Recall false and true from Example 3.7.
C 5.23. Suppose P ⊆ PrPt is equivariant. Then false P = ∅ and true P = P.
Proof. We unpack Example 3.7 and Definition 5.16 and use Corollary 5.22.
The amgis-action
R 5.24. The σ-action (amgis-action) p[u← a] is a dual to the σ-action X[a →u]: this is made formal in Theorem 5.31; see also the later Theorem 6.12, which treats the case of points instead of prepoints. The form of Theorems 5.31 and 6.12 is that This should excite us because (amongst other things) it tells us that the σ-action is extensional/monotone (Theorem 7.1); and it turns out that it also implies that quantification is extensional/monotone too (Lemma 7.3).
The idea of the σ-action comes from previous work [Gabbay 2014; Gabbay 2012; Gabbay and Gabbay 2012] . It is just as useful to us here. D 5.25. Suppose P ⊆ PrPt is equivariant (Definition 2.24) and p∈P. Then define an σ-action (amgis-action) by the rules in Figure 4 , where in that figure: -a∈A i and u∈Set i for some i∈Z.
-b∈A j and y∈Set j-1 for some j∈Z.
-In rule ( σa) X∈Pred and we assume i=j and a ′ ∈A i-1 is chosen fresh (so a ′ #u, p, y). -In rule ( σatm) n∈A i is some atom not necessarily distinct from a. Figure 4 is well-defined. That is, the choice of fresh a
Proof. From Lemma 4.4(1) (property (σα)).
The σ-action maps prepoints to prepoints: PrPt to be a prepoint.
R 5.28. Definition 5.25 is parameterised over equivariant P ⊆ PrPt. Two values for this parameter will interest us in particular:
-The case P = PrPt (for instance Theorem 5.31).
-The case P = Pnt (Definition 6.7).
The very useful Proposition 5.29 shows that P is slightly less important than it might first appear. P 5.29. Suppose P⊆PrPt is equivariant (Definition 2.24) . Suppose p∈P and X∈Pred and i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i . Then:
Proof. Part 1 is direct from Proposition 5.21. For part 2, we reason as follows: Figure 4 ( σb)
Proof that amgis is dual to sigma
As discussed in Remark 5.24 we now prove that σ is dual to σ. This is Proof. By induction on (qd (X), age(X)), lexicographically ordered. We consider the possibilities for X∈Pred:
-The case of and(X ) for X ⊆ fin Pred. We reason as follows:
IH age(X)<age(and(X ))
-The case of neg(X). We reason as follows:
-The case of all[b]X where b∈A j for some j∈Z. Using Lemma 3.5 assume without loss of generality that b is fresh (so b#p, x). Note by Proposition 5.12 that qd (X[b →v]) < qd (all[b]X). We reason as follows:
-The case of elt(y, b) for some j∈Z and y∈Set j-1 and b∈Set j . We reason as follows:
-The case of elt(y, a) for i∈Z and y∈Set i-1 . There are two sub-cases:
-Suppose x=atm(n) for some n∈A i . We reason as follows:
-Suppose x=[b](x@b) for some fresh b∈A i-1 (so b#y, u). We reason as follows: Firstly, the proof here is different. This is expected since the information going into the proofs is different: this paper concerns a concrete model of whose internal structure we have full knowledge, whereas [Gabbay 2012] concerns nominal algebras about which we only know abstract (nominal) algebraic properties.
Secondly and more significantly, Theorem 5.31 is a stronger result-again, this is because we are dealing with a concrete model, and since we built it we can 'look inside' it and take advantage of its specific structure. In the notation of this paper, [Gabbay 2012, Proposition 3.4.2(1)] corresponds to
The freshness condition a#p, x is absent in Theorem 5.31. The key design decision is clause 1 of Definition 5.1, which ensures an empty supporting set. This extra power is required for our results. We can still prove versions of Theorems 6.11 and 6.12 with the condition a#p, x added (the main change is that the subtle technical lemma [Gabbay 2012, Lemma 6.2.2] is required, replacing the straightforward Lemma 5.30 of this paper). But, without clause 1 of Definition 5.1 we would lose Lemma 10.13. R 5.33. It might help to draw an analogy between Theorem 5.31 and the following standard result in ordinary (non-nominal) denotational semantics. Imagine that φ is a formula and s is a term in, say, first-order logic, and imagine that we give formulas and terms a denotational semantics in sets. Then we would expect that
: the model of φ with a substituted for s in a valuation ς is equal to the model of φ in the valuation ς where a maps to the model of s.
Theorem 5.31 corresponds to this, where p plays the role of ς. So points p are analogous to valuation contexts-though p is also more than a valuation context: it does not evaluate atoms to denotations; even if it did, it evaluates to nominal elements, which can be incomplete in the sense of having non-empty support; and p may be subject to filter-like conditions, as we discuss next in Section 6.
POINTS
A point is a prepoint subject to the conditions of Figure 5: -(pUni) is a filter-style condition: a point should believe that to check a universal quantification it suffices to test behaviour at values. -(pFin) is a finiteness condition stronger than finite support: p must 'believe' x ∈ a for at most a finite set of a; it may believe this for infinitely many x, but only for finitely many atoms a.
These intuitions will be made formal in this Section, and Example 6.20 gives points that do not have these properties which we hope will help illustrate the points that do. For now, if the reader thinks of a point as a filter of primitive assertions of the form elt(x, a) ('x is an element of a'), subject to some reasonableness conditions, then they will not go too far wrong.
Interlude: some definitions and lemmas
The technical definitions and lemmas in this subsection will be useful at various points in what follows, but they share a common theme so we gather them together in one subsection.
heads(p) collects the atoms appearing in the head position (to the left of the •) of a•x for some x:
Suppose P⊆PrPt is equivariant and p∈PrPt and i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i-1 . Then
Proof. Consider any j∈Z and b∈A j (by the permutative convention of Definition 2.1, b is distinct from a) such that b ∈heads(p). Consider any y∈Set j-1 . We reason as follows:
Recall false and true from Example 3.7 and emp and set from Definition 3.9 and: L 6.3. Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i-1 . Then: 
Proof. By Lemma 6.2 heads(p[emp i ← a] P ) ⊆ heads(p)∪{a}. We reason as follows, where x∈Set i-1 and a ′ ∈A i-1 is fresh:
Fact of sets L 6.5. Suppose p∈PrPt. Then heads(p)=∅ implies p=∅.
Proof. Immediate from Definitions 5.15 and 6.1. L 6.6. Suppose i∈Z and
Proof. A corollary of Lemmas 6.4 and 6.5.
Fig. 5: Points

Definition and basic properties of points
Definition 6.7 uses the notation from Subsection 10.1: D 6.7. -Suppose p∈PrPt and suppose P⊆Pnt is equivariant. In Figure 5 we give two predicates on p ∈ PrPt. We may write these as predicates, for instance (pFin)(p) will mean 'p has property (pFin)'. -Define Pnt the set of points to be those prepoints satisfying the conditions in Figure 5 . R 6.8. We use (pUni) in Lemma 7.7 (needed for Theorem 7.9) and we use (pFin) in Lemma 10.13 (needed for Theorem 10.14). L 6.9. supp(Pnt) = ∅, so Pnt is equivariant (Definition 2.24) and a#Pnt for any atom a.
Proof. Direct from Theorem 2.15. The corollaries just rephrase the result using Definition 2.24 and Notation 2.10.
RecallPnt from Figure 3 . We may use Notation 6.10 henceforth: N 6.10. Suppose X∈Pred and i∈Z and x∈Set i and p∈Pnt and a∈A i . Then we may write: 
Proposition 5.29(1) -Condition (pFin). From Lemmas 6.2 and 6.9. Theorem 6.12 is a key technical result. This is clearly related to Theorem 5.31, but Theorem 6.12 is the harder and stronger result; it implies Theorem 7.1, that σ is extensional with respect toPnt the denotation in Pnt.
Here Theorem 6.12 requires proof; elsewhere it is taken as a definition [Gabbay 2012, Definition 3.4.1]-so Theorem 6.12 is also a sanity check relative to previous literature that uses σ-algebras Figure 5 , for suppose X∈Pred and i∈Z and a∈A i . Then:
Figure 5(modall), Theorem 6.12 ⇔ ∅ ∈ X PrPt Lemma 6.6 R 6.14. Lemma 6.13 proves Pnt =∅. We now work towards Proposition 6.18, which exhibits an infinite subset of Pnt. This matters because our notation suggests that formulae will be interpreted as sets of points (see Definition 9.14), so it is a good sanity check to know that there is more than one point available. R 6.16. Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i . Proposition 6.18 will prove p a ∈Pnt (in words: p a is a point). We can give some intuition for p a immediately: p a is a point (the least point, in fact) that 'believes' that a is equal to the universal set set level(a) (Definition 3.9).
We can make this a little more formal if we are willing to look ahead to the notation of Section 9 and Definition 9.14. Suppose
We need Lemma 6.17 to prove Proposition 6.18: L 6.17. Suppose i, j∈Z and a∈A i and b∈A j . Suppose P⊆PrPt is equivariant and contains p a . Then
Proof. Every element of p a (Definition 6.15) is an element of A × Pred (a pair of an atom and an internal predicate). To prove part 1, we split these pairs into three subclasses:
-Pairs of the form c•x for some k≥1 and atom c∈A k and some x∈Set k-1 .
-Pairs of the form b•x for some x∈Set j-1 , where j≥1.
-Pairs of the form a•x for some x∈Set i-1 .
We consider each possibility in turn:
which is impossible by construction in Definition 6.15 since c =a.
. We note that: For part 2 we split the pairs into -pairs of the form c•x for some k≥1 and atom c∈A k and some x∈Set k-1 , and -pairs of the form a•x for some x∈Set i-1 .
We reason much as for part 1, but we give full details. We consider each possibility in turn:
. We note that:
Now we assumed p a ∈ P and it follows that a•x ∈ p a [set i ← a].
So we have proved that a pair of an atom and an internal predicate is in p a [set i ← a] if and only if it has the form a•x for x∈Set i-1 . Examining Definition 6.15, we see that p a [set j ← a] = p a as required. P 6.18. If i∈Z and a∈A i then
Proof. We inspect Definition 5.15 and note that p a is indeed a prepoint. We check the conditions of Figure 5 :
-Condition (pUni). We use (modall) from Figure 3 to unpack the all in (pUni). There are two cases: -Suppose i ′ ∈Z and a ′ ∈A i ′ is some atom other than a, and suppose
PrPt and by Theorem 5.31
PrPt . As for the previous case using Lemma 6.17(2). -Condition (pFin). Immediate from Definitions 6.1 and 6.15, and Figure 5 .
We can take Proposition 6.18 further: 12 Recall by our permutative convention from Definition 2.1 that we assume a and b are distinct, even if i = j.
Proof. Choose a ′ ∈A i-1 . We note from Definition 6.15 that a•atm(a ′ ) ∈ p a but a•atm(a ′ ) ∈ p b . E 6.20. Proposition 6.18 gave examples of p∈PrPt such that p∈Pnt. We conclude with examples of p∈PrPt such that p ∈Pnt, because p breaks one of the conditions of Figure 5: -We break (pUni). Take a∈A 3 and p = {a•x | x∈Val 2 } and b∈A 2 . Then we observe that
PrPt . -We break (pFin). Take p = Base (Notation 5.13). Intuitively, p 'believes' that every variableall infinitely many of them-is equal to the universal set set (Definition 3.9).
QUANTIFICATION WITH POINTS
Theorem 7.1 proves the σ-action is extensional with respect to the denotation in Pnt:
T 7.1. Suppose X, Y ∈Pred and i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i . Then
Proof. For the subset inclusion we use Theorem 6.12:
The equality follows by properties of sets. (1) Lemma 7.3 states that all is monotone. Intuitively, this corresponds to "φ ⇒ ψ implies ∀ ∀ ∀a.φ ⇒ ∀ ∀ ∀a.ψ". L 7.3. Suppose X, X ′ ∈ Pred and i∈Z and a∈A i . Then
The second part follows by facts of sets. Figure 5 . The resemblance of (pUni) with Lemma 7.7 is clear but the Lemma still has work to do, because (pUni) gives us a subset inclusion for prepoints, and Lemma 7.7 needs a subset inclusion for points (recall from Notation 6.10 that 
Proof. The first equality is direct from Figure 3 
INTERNAL EXTENSIONALITY
The main result of this Section is Theorem 8.10. Intuitively this asserts that if a point p 'believes' that a and a ′ have the same elements, then p 'believes' that no c can distinguish a and a ′ . Thus inside the model, extensional equality implies indistinguishability (Leibniz equality). This leads to Corollary 8.11 and to soundness of (Leibniz) from Figure 7 in Theorem 9.18.
The proof is not obvious. A crucial step is marked ( †) and occurs in Lemma 8.5.
Preliminary notation and lemmas
The notation and lemmas in this Subsection will be useful for Theorem 8.10 and later. N 8.1. Suppose i∈Z and x∈Set i+1 is a comprehension 13 and y∈Set i . Then define y∈ ∈ ∈x by
where we choose a ′ ∈A i fresh (so a ′ #x, y). Lemma 8.2 is a sanity check: L 8.2. Suppose i∈Z and x∈Set i is a comprehension and a∈A i-1 and a#x.
In words: for the special case in y∈ ∈ ∈x where y is an internal atom and x is an internal comprehension, sets membership is modelled by atoms-concretion.
Proof. We use Lemma 2.34(2) to write x as [a](x@a) and unfold Notation 8.1 and use Lemma 4.11:
Lemma 8.3 proves that Notation 8.1 interacts with the σ-action as we would hope and expect:
. Suppose i∈Z and x∈Set i+1 and y∈Set i . Then
Proof. Choose a ′ ∈A i fresh (so a ′ #x, y, u). We reason as follows:
Lemma 8.4 connects our notation with the σ-action on X∈Pred:
. Suppose X∈Pred and i∈Z and a∈A i and x∈Set i and a#x. Then (using Notation 8.1) -Suppose x=atm(n) for some n∈A k . We reason as follows:
Lemma 4.6 c#y = y∈ ∈ ∈atm(n) Notation 8.1
-Suppose x is a comprehension (not an internal atom). Choose fresh b∈A k-1 (so b#x, y). We reason as follows:
Lemma 4.6 c#y ( †) = y∈ ∈ ∈x Notation 8.1 b#x, y R 8.6. The assumption that c#y makes the step marked ( †) above work. When we apply Lemma 8.5 in Theorem 8.10 we will know this from clause 1 in the definition of Val (Definition 5.1).
Recall int, uni, and cmp from Notation 3.11:
. Suppose k∈Z and x∈Set k-1 and p∈Pnt. Then:
Proof.
(1) Choose c ′ ∈A k-1 fresh (so c ′ #x and c ′ #z ′ for every z ′ ∈Z). We reason as follows:
The case of uni is similar. (2) Choose c ′ ∈A k-1 fresh (so c ′ #x, z). We reason as follows:
Notations 3.11 & 8.1
The extensionality results
Notation 8.8 extends Notations 3.6 and 8.1:
. If X, Y ∈ Pred and i∈Z and a∈A i define X⇒ ⇒ ⇒Y and X ⇔ ⇔ ⇔Y and ∀ ∀ ∀a.X by:
Suppose i∈Z and a∈A i and b∈A i-1 and x∈Set i and y∈Set i-1 . Then define y∈ ∈ ∈a, b∈ ∈ ∈x, and b∈ ∈ ∈a as follows:
y∈ ∈ ∈a = elt(y, a) b∈ ∈ ∈x = atm(b)∈ ∈ ∈x b∈ ∈ ∈a = atm(b)∈ ∈ ∈a = elt(atm(b), a) R 8.9. The denotationPrPt is intensional, meaning that it is not necessarily the case that ∀ ∀ ∀b.(b∈ ∈ ∈x⇔ ⇔ ⇔b∈ ∈ ∈x ′ ) PrPt = ∀ ∀ ∀c.(a∈ ∈ ∈c⇔ ⇔ ⇔a ′ ∈ ∈ ∈c) PrPt . Take for instance x=elt(emp i-1 , a) for some i∈Z and a∈A i , and y=elt(int({emp i-1 , emp i-1 }), a). Then it is a fact that ∀ ∀ ∀c.(c∈ ∈ ∈x⇔ ⇔ ⇔c∈ ∈ ∈x ′ ) PrPt = PrPt and ∀ ∀ ∀b.(x∈ ∈ ∈b⇔ ⇔ ⇔x ′ ∈ ∈ ∈b) PrPt PrPt.
14 For Pnt, the situation is different: the equality does hold, and we can call the denotationPnt extensional. In this Subsection we now set about proving this, culminating with Corollary 8.13. T 8.10. Suppose i∈Z and a, a ′ ∈A i and b∈A i-1 and c∈A i+1 . Then (using Notations 8.8 and 6.10) 
Proof. By Lemma 7.5(2) it suffices to prove [ [(∀ ∀ ∀b.(b∈ ∈ ∈a⇔ ⇔ ⇔b∈ ∈ ∈a ′ ))⇒ ⇒ ⇒∀ ∀ ∀c.(a∈ ∈ ∈c⇔ ⇔ ⇔a ′ ∈ ∈ ∈c)] ] = Pnt. By Theorem 7.9 we can expand the remaining quantifiers as intersections of substitution instances. Using Figure 1 and Lemma 8.3 we can push the instantiating substitutions (σ-actions) down through quantifiers and connectives.
Thus after some basic calculations we see that it suffices to check for every p∈Pnt that
To do this, we will work by induction on w∈Val i+1 (Definition 5.1) to prove the following predicate:
We consider the possibilities for w∈Val i+1 :
-The case that w=[c](v∈ ∈ ∈c) for v∈Val i-1 and c∈A i . We assumed [c](v∈ ∈ ∈c)∈Val i+1 and it follows from Lemma 5.4 that c#v. Thus by Lemma 8.5 a∈ ∈ ∈w = v∈ ∈ ∈a and a
. Thus using Lemma 8.7(1) we reason as follows:
-The case that w=cmp(w
. Thus using Lemma 8.7(2) we reason as follows:
C 8.11. Suppose i∈Z and X∈Pred and x, x ′ ∈Set i and b∈A i-1 and b#x, x ′ . Then (using Notations 8.8 and 6.10) 
Proof. From Theorem 8.10, using Theorem 7.9, Figure 1 , Lemma 8.3, and Lemma 8.4.
Proposition 8.12 reverses the implication of Theorem 8.10 (which is not hard), and this allows us to note an equality of denotations in Corollary 8.13. P 8.12. Suppose i∈Z and a, a ′ ∈A i and b∈A i-1 and c∈A i+1 . Then (using Notation 8.8)
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 8.10 it suffices to check that -if for any
Choose some y and choose a fresh c∈A i (so c#y, z) and take in particular z = [c](y∈ ∈ ∈c). The result follows by Lemma 8.5. C 8.13. Continuing the notation of Proposition 8.12 and using Notation 8.8,
Proof. From Theorem 8.10 and Proposition 8.12. Proof.
and recall p a from Definition 6.15. It is a fact that p a ∈ X, intuitively because p a 'believes' that emp i-1 is an element of a but does not believe that emp i-1 is an element of b.
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Internal atoms are internal sets, but they are not internal values (Remark 5.5). Recall from Lemma 5.10(1) that num(n) i from Definition 5.8 is always a value. We now prove that {num(n) i | n≥0} is an infinite set of non-coextensional values, for every i∈Z: Proof. We prove that num(n) i is coextensional with num(n) i : by Definition 8.14 and Lemma 7.5(2) it suffices to prove [ [iff(num(n) i @c, num(n) i @c)] ] = Pnt for some c∈A i-1 . This is clear from Lemma 5.19.
We now prove by induction on n + m that if num(n) i and num(m) i are coextensional then n = m. There are various cases:
-The case that n=0 and m>0. Choose c∈A i-1 and note by Lemma 7.5(2) and Lemma 5.19 that it suffices to exhibit a point p that is in [ [num(m) 
We unpack Definition 5.8 and see that [ [num(m) 
. We take p = p c (Definition 6.15). -The case that n>0 and m=0 . . . is symmetric with the previous case.
-The case that m=m ′ +1 and n=n ′ +1. From Definition 5.8 and Lemma 2.34(1),
It suffices to exhibit a point p that is in one but not the other. By inductive hypothesis there exists a p 
By similar reasoning we deduce that p ∈ [ [elt(num(n ′ ) i-2 , c)] ] ⇔ ⊥, so we are done.
9. TYPED SET THEORY 9.1. Formulae of the language of typed set theory D 9.1. Let (raw) formulae and (raw) terms be inductively defined as in Figure 6 . In that figure, a ranges over atoms of level at least 1.
Definition 9.2 is standard:
2. Suppose t is a term (Definition 9.1). Then extend level (a) from Definition 2.1 from atoms to all terms by:
Call a formula φ or term t stratified when:
E 9.3. Suppose a∈A 2 , b∈A 3 , and c∈A 4 . Then a∈ ∈ ∈b, b∈ ∈ ∈c, and a= = =a are stratified, and a∈ ∈ ∈c, b∈ ∈ ∈a, a∈ ∈ ∈a, and a= = =b are not stratified. Fig. 8 : Interpretation of formulae and terms D 9.4. The language of typed set theory (TST) consists of stratified formulae and terms. A Hilbert-style derivation system for TST is given in Figure 7 .
In that figure and henceforth, we write φ[a:=s] and t[a:=s] for the usual capture-avoiding substitution on syntax.
We assume that levels are arranged to respect stratification, so that when we write [a:=s] it is understood that we assume a∈A level(s) . R 9.5. We only care about stratified formulae and terms henceforth-that is, we restrict attention from all (raw) formulae and terms of Definition 9.1, to those that are stratified.
So for all terms and formulae considered from now on, the reader should assume they are stratified. R 9.6. In Definition 3.1 levels ranged over all of Z. In TST types/levels range over strictly positive natural numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . and (continuing in the language of types) -∈ ∈ ∈ polymorphically takes two terms of type i and i+1 to a formula for each i≥1, -equality polymorphically takes two terms of type i to a formula, and -sets comprehension { { {a| | |φ} } } takes an atom of type i≥1 and a formula φ to a term of type i+1.
Interpretation for formulae and terms
D 9.7. Define an interpretation of stratified formulae φ and terms s as in Figure 8 , mapping φ to φ ∈ Pred and s of level i≥1 to s ∈ Set i . R 9.8. For the reader's convenience we give pointers for the notation used in the right-hand sides of the equalities in Figure 8: -false is from Example 3.7.
-neg is from Definition 3.1.
-imp and iff are from Notation 3.6. -t ∈ ∈ ∈ s is from Notation 8.1.
-[a] φ is from Definitions 2.30 and 3.1.
-atm is from Definition 3.1. R 9.9. Figure 8 translates the syntax of formulae φ and terms s from Figure 6 to the syntax of internal predicates and internal sets from Definition 3.1. This translation is not entirely direct:
(1) s= = =t is translated to a universally quantified extensional equality.
(2) t∈ ∈ ∈s is primitive in formulae but only primitive in internal predicates if s is an atom. -The case of φ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ψ. From Figure 8 and Definition 3.1 using the inductive hypothesis.
-The case of ∀ ∀ ∀a.φ. From Figure 8 and Definition 3.1 using the inductive hypothesis.
-The case of s= = =t. We refer to Notation 3.6 and use Lemma 3.8 and Figure 8 and Definition 3.1 and the inductive hypothesis. -The case of t∈ ∈ ∈s. We refer to Notation 8.1 and use Lemma 3.8 and Proposition 4.3.
9.3. Properties of the interpretation D 9.11. Define the size of a stratified formula φ and stratified term t inductively as follows:
size(∀ ∀ ∀a.φ) = size(φ)+1 size(t∈ ∈ ∈s) = size(t)+size(s) + 1 size(s= = =t) = size(s)+size(t) + 1 L 9.12. Suppose φ is a stratified formula and t, and r are stratified terms and b∈A level(t) . Then:
Note by Lemma 9.10 that t ∈Set level(t) so that the σ-action [b → t ] above is well-defined (Definition 4.1).
Proof. By induction on size(φ) and size(r). We consider each case in turn:
-The case of ⊥ ⊥ ⊥. We reason as follows:
Fact of syntax = false Figure 8 -The case of φ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ψ. We reason as follows:
Fact of syntax -The case of ∀ ∀ ∀a.φ. We reason as follows, where we α-rename if necessary to assume a#t (from which it follows by Theorem 2.15 that a# t ):
Fact of syntax, a#t 
-The case of a (any atom other than b). By Figure 8 a =atm(a) . We use rule (σb) of Figure 1 .
-The case of { { {a| | |φ} } }. α-converting if necessary assume a is fresh (so a#t, and by Theorem 2.15 also a# t ). We reason as follows:
, and by Theorem 2.15
13. Suppose φ is a stratified formula and s is a stratified term. Suppose a ∈ A i+1 and level (s) = i. Then
Proof. We reason as follows:
Lemma 9.12
The denotation of a formula
Recall -from Definition 9.7 and [ [-] ] from Notation 6.10: D 9.14. Suppose φ is a stratified formula and s is a stratified term (Subsection 9.1). 
Proof. For part 1 we note by Definition 9.14, Figure 8 , and Corollary 5.23 that
Part 2 is similar, from Notation 8.8. L 9.16. Suppose φ is a stratified formula and s is a stratified term. Suppose a∈A i and level (s) = i. Then:
Proof. Note by Lemma 6.9 that a#Pnt. Part 1 follows from Lemma 7.5.
For 
Proof. Choose fresh c∈level (s)-1 (so c#s). We unpack Definition 9.14 and Figure 8 Thus, [a]Pnt changes little or not at all when the name or the level of the bound atom changes, whereas the set powerset level(a) (U ) changes significantly by becoming larger and smaller. Both are reasonable models of 'a universal set', but [a]Pnt comes visibly closer to being a model of 'the universal set'-and arguably it comes as close as it is possible to come, in a stratified language.
CONSISTENCY OF TST+
We are now ready to prove consistency of TST+ and thus of NF. With the machinery we have constructed so far, the proof is fairly direct:
Consistent renaming of levels
We need some notation to express the condition (TA) in the next Subsection. -R is finite (contains finitely many pairs of atoms).
-R is a partial bijection.
Suppose R is a consistent renaming of levels. Then supp(R) = dom(R) ∪ img(R) and a#R if and only if a ∈dom(R) ∪ img(R).
Proof. By routine calculations using Corollary 2.12. D 10.4. Suppose R is a consistent renaming of levels. Extend R to a relation on Pred and on Set i for i∈Z as follows:
′ #R and R∪{(a, a ′ )} is a consistent renaming of levels and X (R∪{(a, a
D 10.5. Write X ≃ X ′ when there exists a consistent renaming of levels R such that X R X ′ . Definition 10.6 is like Definition 10.2, but for formulae and terms instead of internal predicates and internal sets: D 10.6. Extend R to a relation on formulae and terms as follows:
-If a, a ′ #R and R∪{(a, a ′ )} is a consistent renaming of levels and φ (R∪{(a, a
Consistent with Definition 10.5 write φ ≃ φ ′ when there exists a consistent renaming of levels R such that φ R φ ′ .
L 10.7. Suppose φ and φ ′ are stratified formulae.
Proof. By a routine induction on the derivation of φ R φ ′ , where R is the consistent renaming of levels that witnesses φ ≃ φ ′ . The only slightly interesting point is that in the translation of s= = =t we might need to introduce fresh atoms c and c ′ into the consistent renaming of atoms relating φ and φ ′ ; this is because the clause for s= = =t in Figure 8 introduces c. In addition TST+ has the typical ambiguity axiom scheme: for each pair of stratified closed formulae φ and φ ′ , if φ ≃ φ ′ then we assume an axiom
R 10.11. Typical ambiguity allows us to consistently 'raise' and 'lower' the level of atoms. All the atoms must be raised together by the same amount.
Note that we can do this from within a derivation (not just as a property of derivations), because we have an axiom asserting the implication. A concise but clear presentation of typical ambiguity is in [Wang 1981, page 92] , see also [Specker 1962, page 119] . R 10.12. NF is known consistent relative to TST+ (the proof is summarised in [Specker 1962 ], a more detailed account in German is in the final three pages of [Specker 1958]) . So, to prove consistency of NF it suffices to consider TST+.
The relative consistency is intuitively reasonable: NF and TST differ in that TST's language is stratified whereas NF's is stratifiable-stratifications exist, but we do not say which one. So it is reasonable that NF should be equivalent to TST plus axioms that allow us to adjust our stratification on-the-fly to another possible stratification, if we so choose.
In the rest of this section we prove soundness of (TA) in our models, and so consistency of TST+ and thus consistency of NF.
Proof of consistency of TST+
Recall from Lemma 6.13 that ∅ is a point: L 10.13. Suppose X∈Pred and supp(X)=∅.
( Proof. Consider p∈Pnt. By (pFin) of Figure 5 heads(p) is finite; write heads(p) = {a 1 , . . . , a n } (any order will do) and write j 1 =level (a 1 )-1, . . . , j n =level (a n )-1. We reason as follows: 
. This is immediate since ∅ is symmetric under consistently renaming levels in its elements (since it has no elements). R 10.15. A proof of Theorem 10.14 by induction on φ is possible, but either way the key point of the proof is the translational symmetry of internal predicates and sets.
Theorem 10.14 is an equivariance property, in the same sense of Theorem 2.15 but for a different group: the translations of Z-which underlies the consistent renaming of levels of Definition 10.2-instead of the group of finite permutations of A. C
⊢ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ is not derivable in TST+. In words: TST+ is consistent. As a corollary, the system NF [Quine 1937] is consistent.
Proof. Just as the proof of Corollary 9.19, using Theorems 9.18 and 10.14. NF is consistent relative to TST+ [Specker 1962 ].
CONCLUSIONS
The consistency of NF itself solves a longstanding open problem and reassures us that we can indeed reason in set theory with a universal set. The mathematics seems fairly general, and we hope it might be applied to solve more problems.
Given our proof, we can examine it to see how much set-theoretic strength it really uses, and thus see relative to what system we have proved NF consistent. 17 We have not used the Axioms of Choice or Replacement in the proofs of this paper: we have proved NF consistent relative to Zermelo set theory (Z).
The proofs of this paper are not short, but some of that burden is a one-off cost from the use of nominal techniques. So: -we do not need to explain or give examples for sets, functions and function application, powersets, cardinality, or universal quantification to the reader, but -we do need to devote space to describing atoms, the principles of Equivariance and Conservation of Support, atoms-abstraction, support, freshness, and the N-quantifier.
But (subsets of) these ideas turn up in every paper using nominal techniques and are amortised by shorter and simpler proofs. Overall, the technical complexity of this paper seems quite reasonable.
18
17 Consistency proofs are always relative to another foundation. So for instance: ZFA set theory is consistent relative to ZF set theory-meaning that if ZF is consistent then so is ZFA; and the FM set theory underlying nominal techniques was originally developed to prove ZFA+¬AC consistent relative to ZFA [Fraenkel 1922 ]. So, the sentence "NF is consistent" must necessarily continue with "relative to system X", for some value of X. Any value of X would do, but generally speaking the more weak X is the more interesting the result. For more on these issues see a very accessible account by Boolos [Boolos 1994] . 18 As is often the case, much of the difficulty has been in getting the right set of definitions.
Future work
Consider that the structure of points a•x resembles that of a λ-term in normal form, if we read a•x as 'a applied to x'. It is natural to generalise this to a•x 1 • . . . •x n and try to build stratified models of the λ-calculus, following the philosophy of "λ as a universal quantifier" from e.g. [Gabbay and Gabbay 2010; Gabbay and Gabbay 2012] , in which λ-terms are interpreted as sets of points and λ-abstraction as a variant of ∀-quantification. One motivation for doing this is that it might lead to new dependent type theories, since the models, being sets, have a logical flavour in which we can interpret conjunction, possibly negation, quantification, and even perhaps sets membership, just as we have in this paper. This paper proves consistency by building a concrete model; there is no formal consideration of what abstract class of structures that model belongs to. For instance, we can reasonably declare that our model should solve the equality M = powerset (M) for some category and some meaning of powerset -and it then remains to examine the model for clues to what these should be. This is an opportunity particularly since many ways may exist to abstract the concrete model depending on what parts of its structure we consider important. For instance, the syntactic model of the simply-typed λ-calculus (terms quotiented by β-equivalence) can be generalised in at least three ways: to setsand-functions, to Cartesian Closed Categories, and (noting that the confluence proof works without types, so perhaps they were not important) to domains.
Such a generalisation need not be specific to TST+ or NF, since our model is also a model of TST which is an important logic in its own right. Indeed, perhaps we should forget the set theory and just think about stratification and semantics of stratified (not necessarily 'sets-flavoured') languages.
Stratification plays a role in two places in this paper:
-in (σelta) in Figure 1 , where a 'applied to' y is reduced because a is instantiated, and -in ( σa) in Figure 4 , where a 'applied to' y is 'dereferenced' to X in a context assigning a ′ to y in a context assigning a to x.
Looking forward to Equation 1 below, we can read stratification as imposing a finite but unbounded limit on the number of times that we have to pass through the equality between sets and predicates in calculating a denotation.
Extensions of the semantics
Returning to the application to TST+ and NF, we can make a few informal but technical remarks about extensions of our semantics.
We speculate that the semantics we have given in this paper is inconsistent with the Axiom of Countable Choice. This is because internal predicates are finite: in particular, the X in and(X ) in Definition 3.1 must be finite-so that intuitively, internal predicates can encode only finitely many choices.
We noted in Remark 5.6 the possiblity of relaxing this by allowing X to be (say) countably infinite (still subject to finite support; but see next paragraph). It seems plausible that this would yield a model that supports the Axiom of Countable Choice-we simply enumerate our choices in some countably infinite set X . The inductions in this paper are on age, level, or quantifier depth so allowing infinitely broad syntax should not affect this provided that syntax is still finitely deep and if we still insist on finite support and on a lower bound on the levels of atoms (minlevel from Definition 3.12).
We might also choose to relax finite support too, to (say) countable support. The nominal theory can be generalised. 19 The inductions on levels of atoms would survive, again provided we insist this countable support must be distributed over finitely many levels or more generally must respect a lower bound on levels.
Taking this further, it seems plausible that this could be generalised to any fixed ordinal.
The generalisation of the proofs is not entirely straightforward, but we believe it should work, if we are willing to pay the price in extra complexity of the definitions and lemmas. The proof of Lemma 10.13 as currently written depends on a finite number of applications of Lemma 4.6; so we might need to generalise the theory of substitutions to allow infinite simultaneous substitutions.
The Fundamental Equation of this paper
We sketch at a very high level how this paper works: to prove the consistency of NF it would seem that we need to make X look like powerset (X). This paper does not do that: instead we solve the equation
In words: sets are nominal atoms-abstractions of predicates.
-We see this in syntax when we write a sets comprehension { { {a| | |φ} } } in Figure 6 , and this is reflected in the syntax of internal sets and predicates in Definition 3.1 when we write "If i∈Z then Set κ i = {[a]X | X∈Pred κ , a∈A i-1 }", which we can simplify for the sake of this discussion to Set = [A]Pred.
-We see this again in the semantics in rule (modset) of Figure 3 , when we write "a#x ⇒ x P = [a] x@a P ", which we can simplify for this discussion to [a]X P = [a] X P (atomsabstraction in syntax translates to atoms-abstraction in semantics; a specifically 'nominal' definition).
Rule (modset) looks innocuous but is significant because the surrounding machinery enables us to write it, and because we use it to construct a compositional translation from syntax to semantics validating properties such as extensionality (Subsection 8.2) and Typical Ambiguity (Subsection 10.3).
Thus at a high level, this paper works by solving Equation 1 above. Nominal techniques add value because the equation can be expressed in FM sets but not (say) in ordinary ZF sets.
Closed conclusions can still require open reasoning (of course)
It might be useful to conclude by trying to avert a natural misunderstanding of this paper, which we can summarise as follows: The denotations of internal predicates are sets of points, which may have nonempty support, however for a closed predicate the information in those points does not matter (see Lemma 10.13) . Therefore, the nominal material is superfluous and should be eliminated and simplified away.
Intuitively this is mistaken because Equation 1 above is inherently an equation in FM sets. In more technical terms we can note: -The calculation of the denotation of a closed predicate usually involves the calculation of the denotation of open predicates-and there, open structure becomes important. Any application of Theorem 5.31 exploits this, and it is unclear how we would prove Theorem 7.1, thus Lemma 7.3, and ultimately Lemma 7.8, without this.
We make further technical comments about where this behaviour appears in the underlying definitions:
(1) Figure 3 (modall) is inherently nominal, as noted above.
(2) Rule (pUni) in Figure 5 'exposes' information that p carries about the atom a to the denotation of X, thus moving from closed to open elements. (3) Rule ( σa) in Figure 4 makes the denotation, the structure of points, and sets membership interact in a complex way in which names play a key role (see also the dual rule (σelta) in Figure 1 ). 
